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аннотация
цель: Целью настоящей статьи является оценка правовых гарантий конкуренции (в том числе свободной) между подрядчиками 
при осуществлении процесса государственных закупок, что означает не только заключение контракта в соответствии с кон-
кретными правовыми нормами между государственным (либо частным) покупателем и подрядчиком (подрядчиками) для удов-
летворения спроса на определенные товары или услуги, но и надлежащее соблюдение процессуальных норм и порядка осуществле-
ния государственных закупок, т.е. последовательность фактических и юридических действий с момента публичного объявления 
о закупке до окончательного выполнения всех обязательств сторон по договору о государственных закупках.
Методология проведения работы: Основным методом исследования является догматико-юридический сравнительный метод, 
а именно – анализ юридического текста различных законов. Кроме того, осуществлен критический анализ научной литературы. 
В данном контексте наиболее важным представляется указание взаимоотношений между конкуренцией и добросовестной кон-
куренцией в системе государственных закупок, а также  других основных принципов и правил: недискриминации, прозрачности, 
беспристрастности, объективности, законности, открытости, правило письменной формы, приоритет использования тен-
дерного режима, т.е. правило применения неконкурентных режимов или приоритетов предоставления государственных закупок 
в тендерном режиме. Соблюдение всех этих правил гарантирует добросовестную конкуренцию в течение всего процесса государ-
ственных закупок. Следует подчеркнуть, что научных исследований на данную тему проведено довольно мало как в Польше, так 
и в других странах ЕС.
Результаты работы: Результаты исследования показывают, что новые директивы ЕС о государственных закупках 2014 года, а 
именно, Директива 2014/23/ЕС, Директива 2014/24/ЕС и Директива 2014/25/ЕС, на самом деле не направлены на регулирование кон-
куренции в качестве основной цели. Тем не менее, тщательный анализ упомянутых директив приводит к выводу, что эти дирек-
тивы предусматривают стимулирование экономической конкуренции. Это достигается в целом благодаря открытию рынка 
государственных закупок для микро-, малых и средних предприятий (сектор малого и среднего бизнеса).
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abstract
Purpose: the purpose of this publication is to assess legal guaranties of competition (free competition) between contractors in broadly perceived 
process of granting public procurement, which means not only entering into a contract subject to the specific legal regime, concluded by a public 
purchaser, or possible private purchaser subordinated to that legal regime, with a contractor (contractors) in order to satisfy its demand for 
certain goods or services, but also a due course of the whole process of granting public procurement, perceived as a sequence of factual and legal 
actions beginning with the moment of public announcement of a procurement, sending an invitation for submitting offers or sending invitation 
to negotiate for selection of an offer of a given contractor, up till final fulfilment of all obligations of the parties under the public procurement 
contract. 
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1. Introduction
The essay is the second part of the series of 
publications which are suppose to provide for a broad 
legal analysis of all legal safeguards of economic 
competition within the public procurement legal 
system. As stated in the previous article, all different 
sets of regulations, at all various levels, including 
international law in the subject area, the European 
Union regulations and national state regulations of 
public procurement should be analysed 1.
An appropriate and rational legal regulation of 
acquisitions undertaken by public entities recently 
has become the crucial factor which influences 
economic development and social welfare of 
modern state. Moreover, the global economic crisis 
increases the necessity of seeking the most effective 
system of organising such purchases. It is naturally 
connected with an amount of public funds involved 
in many public projects. Public money is often spend 
in big amounts for either huge public constructions 
(like roads, highways, airports, railways, metro and 
subway systems, schools, universities, hospitals etc. 
– majority connected to public transportation). But, 
what is often forgotten, the biggest government 
spending relates to military expenditure – according 
to the 2016 different countries’  budgets: USA spent 
604.5 bn. dollars, China – 145 bn. dollars, Russian 
Federation – 58.9 bn. dollars, Saudi Arabia – 56.9 
bn. dollars, United Kingdom – 52.5 bn. dollars, India 
– 51.1, South Korea – 47.3 bn. dollars, Australia – 
24.2 bn. dollars, Brazil – 23.5 bn. dollars, Italy – 22.3 
bn. dollars, Israel – 19.1, Iraq – 18.1 bn. dollars 2, 
and Poland spent 9 bn. dollars (2 % of GDP) 3.
Noteworthy, legal regulation of public procurement 
and antitrust regulation (competition protection 
law) are perceived as equally relevant in terms of 
competition on the market 4. It may be said that in fact 
the main goal of regulation of public procurement 
is to guarantee a competition between entities 
struggling for acquisition of goods and services 
from the public sector. In such terms, other goals 
of the public procurement legal regulations have 
secondary importance and in fact they circulate 
around the main goal. Therefore, secondary goals 
cannot remain contradictory to the main goal. As 
a consequence, it seems that public procurement 
 1 See Eryk Kosiński, Legal guarantees of economic competition in the public procurement under international law regulations. The 1994 
Government Procurement Agreement, "Вестник Волжского Университета имени В.Н. Татищева” No. 3/2016 (ISSN 2076-7919, ББК 65), 
p. 5 ff. Additionally: Eryk Kosiński, Prawne gwarancje wolnej konkurencji w systemie zamówień publicznych w Polsce (in:) Marcin Smaga, 
Mateusz Winiarz, Dyscyplina finansów publicznych. Doktryna, orzecznictwo, praktyka, Warszawa 201 5, p. 297 ff.
 2 See The Military Balance 2017. The annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics, The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, https://www.iiss.org/-/media//images/publications/the%20military%20balance/milbal%202017/final%20free%20
graphics/mb2017-top-15-defence-budgets.jpg?la=en (16.03.2017).
 3 See http://www.mon.gov.pl/d/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2016/02/budzet2016.pdf (16.03.2017).
 4 Stefan E. Weishaar, Cartels, Competition and Public Procurement, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA, 2013, p. 1.
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law belongs to the same group of legal regulations 
as competition law (antitrust regulation). It is rightly 
underlined in the literature that “Antitrust policy 
aims at preventing companies from abusing market 
power, restraining free trade and/or forming anti-
competitive agreements. Its objective is to foster 
competition in the interest of consumer welfare” 5.
As for the purpose of this essay, the public 
procurement shall be understood as the whole 
process of purchasing goods, services, labour etc. 
by public entity, finalized after a public tender by 
conclusion of an appropriate agreement (contract). 
This process includes preliminary announcement 
about planned public procurement organised by a 
certain public institution, announcement about an 
acquisition, technical specifications of tender, formal 
conclusion of a public procurement contract of and 
its fulfilment (till the very moment when all mutual 
obligations of parties expire). That means a public 
procurement in broad meaning (public procurement 
sensu largo) 6. 
Public procurement can be also perceived as a form 
of spending public funds, where tendering institutions 
intend to spend public money as to achieve certain 
economic effects (acquisition of goods, services, 
supplies, constructions) in a competitive environment 7.
Taking all abovementioned remarks into account, 
it can be stated that legal regulation of public 
procurement constitute a part of general regulation 
of competition on the market (free market-protective 
function). Other functions have secondary meaning, 
for example economic effectiveness (value for 
money), anti-crime policy (general fight against 
bribery), promotion of economic development 
(industrial policy), achieving certain social aims 
(social welfare, like general employment policy, 
stimulation of disabled persons’ employment, post-
prison employment, young people employment, 
etc.), or environment protection aims (pro-ecological 
policy). This concept may be supported by the broad 
acceptance of variety of tasks put before competition 
law besides maximising of economic effectiveness 
before, such as for instance European integration, 
social welfare, or industrial policy 8.
2. The meaning of competition
It is beyond doubt that the concept of competition 
constitutes one of the most ambiguous concepts 
of law and economy 9. Moreover, one has to point 
that the term of competition is also a phenomenon 
which appears in other sciences, like sociology, 
polytology, biology, physics, mathematics, etc. 
However, one ought to notice, law and economy 
use the term “competition” in economic sense. So, as 
far as legal texts concerned, there is so-called “legal 
conceptualization of economy” taking place (viz. 
economic terms transferred directly into the law) 10.
 5 Panagiotis N. Fotis, Competition Policy and firm’s damages (in:): Joseph E. Harrington Jr, Yannis Katsoulacos, Recent Advantages in the 
Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, Cheltenham, UK – Northampton, MA, USA, 2012, p. 116.
 6 In Poland the term ”public procurement” is defined as a contract which is subordinated to specific legal regime, concluded by public 
purchaser or private purchaser subject to the regime, named ‘Tendering Authority’, with ‘Supplier’ (named originally in Polish “a Performer”), 
in order to satisfy its demand for certain goods (commodities or services) – see art. 2 point 12 of the 2004 Public Procurement Act (act 
of 29 January 2004 on public procurement; consolidated version Official Journal of the Polish Republic of 2013, sec. 907 with further 
amendments). According to the European Union law, there is a division between a public tender and a public contract. According to the 
art. 1 sec. 2 of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2014/24/UE of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and 
repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (Official Journal of the European Union L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 65) the public procurement (franc. la passation 
d’un marché publics; niem. öffentliche Auftragsvergabe) defines as “the acquisition by means of a public contract of works, supplies or 
services by one or more contracting authorities from economic operators chosen by those contracting authorities, whether or not the works, 
supplies or services are intended for a public purpose”. Furthermore,  the term of public contracts (franc. marchés publics; niem. öffentliche 
Aufträge) is defined by art. 2 sec. 1 point 5 of Directive 2014/24/UE as “contracts for pecuniary interest concluded in writing between one or 
more economic operators and one or more contracting authorities and having as their object the execution of works, the supply of products 
or the provision of services”. So, obviously there is a difference in terminology between Polish and the EU regulations. Consequently, a 
harmonization of terminology seems to be required.
 7 Leon Kieres in: Maciej Guziński, red., Zamówienia publiczne jako przedmiot regulacji prawnej, Wrocław 2012, p. 12.
 8 Maximising of economic effectiveness is recognized as the main aim of public procurement regulations by Marek Szydło. Vide: Prawna 
koncepcja zamówienia publicznego, Warszawa 2014, p. 1ff. There are different approaches in the literature as far as aims of public 
procurement regulations concerned. For example, Michał Wieloński in: Europejskie prawo zamówień publicznych jako narzędzie polityki 
społeczno-gospodarczej, Warszawa 2013, p. 80, writes: „generally, public procurements have to ease pathologies connected with 
forced sequestration of money of owners and giving them bureaucratic management”. Further, on p. 87 this author points out that public 
procurements constitute a manner of accomplishment of public expenditure.
 9 See inter alia: Friedrich August von Hayek, The Meaning of Competition (in:) Individualism and Economic Order, The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago,Third Impression 1958, pp. 92–94.
 10 See generally about legal conceptualization of different areas of human life in: Marcin Hotel, Aleksandra Rychlewska, Jurydyzacja życia 
a skuteczność prawa, Kwartalnik Prawo-Społeczeństwo-Ekonomia 1/2015, p. 43 ff.
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The term “competition” comes from Latin. In Latin 
verb ‘competo’ (competo, competere, competivi, 
competitus) meant ‘to solicit for, to fight for something 
together; to meet, to coincide in the same time; to 
agree, to scramble for something together; to be 
eligible, to be sufficient’, and noun ‘competition’ was 
understood as ‘common search’ 11. 
Now-a-days competition is viewed as a process of 
rivalry between (among) organisms, animals, groups 
etc. for territory, niche, resources, goods, female/
male partner, prestige, respect, prizes, social status, 
group status, leadership. Competition is the opposite 
term to cooperation 12. In the economy competition 
means rivalry between salesmen aspiring to achieve 
such goals as growth of income, shares in market or 
sales volume by diversification elements of marketing 
composition: price, product, strategy of distribution 
and promotion, and efforts of two or more subjects 
acting separately to assure themselves change with 
third party by offering the best conditions 13. 
Robert H. Bork in his fundamental work „The Antitrust 
Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself” (1978) described 
five possible meaning of competition. Firstly, 
competition can be perceived as a rivalry process. 
Secondly, competition can be understood as a 
state of lack of restrictions of doing business. Next, 
competition is a state of market where an individual 
purchaser or seller does not affect price of buying or 
selling goods. Fourthly, competition can be perceived 
as a state of atomisation of sections of a market. 
According to the last conception, competition is a 
state when interest of a consumer is fully protected 
(without intervention of a court) 14.
According to some economists there is no need to 
define the term of competition. More important is 
to describe all the crucial features of competition. 
Outstanding Polish economist Adam Noga pointed 
at such characteristics as a fear towards competitors 
as a motivation to act more effectively, lack of 
space for all entrepreneurs within a certain sector of 
economy, selection of entrepreneurs and adjustment 
to the needs of consumers, etc. 15 Robert Bork and 
Ward S. Bowman has written that the most important 
feature of competition is “the essential mechanism of 
competition and its prime virtue that more efficient 
firms take business away from the less efficient” 16.
However, from the juridical point of view, strict 
describing the concept of competition seems to 
be crucial. An accurate definition of competition 
circumscribes an area of state intervention in term of 
antitrust. It delineates the borders of public interest at 
stake 17.
 Depending on economic ideas, we can perceive 
economic competition from many perspectives, 
starting from perfect competition (also known as 
symmetric competition or pure competition) to 
imperfect competition (also known as asymmetric 
competition) and monopolistic competition. In 1940s 
and 1950s, there was born the new theory of workable 
competition and effective competition in the economy 18. 
German economists from the Freiburg Ordoliberal 
 10 See generally about legal conceptualization of different areas of human life in: Marcin Hotel, Aleksandra Rychlewska, Jurydyzacja życia 
a skuteczność prawa, Kwartalnik Prawo-Społeczeństwo-Ekonomia 1/2015, p. 43 ff.
 11 See AbleMedia English-Latin Latin-English Dictionary by William Whitaker, http://ablemedia.com/ctcweb/showcase/wordsonline.html 
(27.03.2017).
 12 Competition, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Competition (27.03.2017).
 13 Mirriam-Webster On-line Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/competition (28.03.2017).
 14 „… a state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be increased by moving to alternative state of affairs through judicial decree”. 
Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, New York 1978, p. 58 ff.
 15 Adam Noga, Piąta fala konkurencji, Roczniki Kolegium Analiz Ekonomicznych, Warszawa 2003, z. 11, p. 138.
 16 Robert H. Bork, Ward S. Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, Columbia Law Review Vol. 65, No. 3, 1965, p. 364.
 17 See: Elżbieta Modzelewska Wąchal, Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, Warszawa 2002, p. 14-15. See further 
considerations in: Eryk Kosiński, Rodzaje i zakres sektorowych wyłączeń zastosowania ogolnych reguł ochrony konkurencji, Poznań 2007, 
p. 55 ff; Pinar Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law. Law and Eonomic Approaches, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2012, 
p. 25 ff.
 18 The workable competition theory was developed by John Maurice Clark (see his publication: Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 
The American Economic Review 1940, Vol. 30, Nr 2, p. 241 ff).Moreover, in 1961 he introduced the effective competition theory – see: 
Competition as a Dynamic Process, Washington D.C. 1961, p. IX ff). See additionally: Michaela Drahos, Convergence of Competition 
Laws and Policie in the European Community. Germany, Austria and Netherlands, The Hague – London – Boston 2001, pp. 40–41; Simon 
Bishop, Mike Walker, Economics of E.C. Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurment, London – Dublin –  Hong Kong 1999, 
p. 13 ff; F.A. von Hayek, supra, p. 92 ff.
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School have created concept of so-called “complete 
competition” (vollständiger Konkurrenz; vollständiger 
Wettbewerb), which is fact is similar to the perfect 
competition 19.
Besides the term of “competition”, both scholar 
literature and legal texts are using quite often the term 
of “free competition”. The concept of free competition 
can be described as a full and unrestricted competition 
on the market (which is similar to the perfect competition) 
or, on the other hand, may be rendered into a freedom 
to compete 20. Generally speaking, when approaching 
free competition the idea of freedom is prerequisite. It 
is rightly stated that „Freedom in common terms means 
owning personal spiritual space (in internal sense), and 
additionally lack of any personal coercion, lack of 
restrictions from the government and other authorities 
together with social customs and natural conditions 
(in outer sense). In other words, freedom is perceived 
as a lack of external restrictions, both physical and 
psychological, imposed by other people (…) the idea 
of freedom generates necessity of elimination of 
obstacles and behaviours which restrict an individual 
in terms of his/her choices and actions” 21.
Noteworthy, economic (or any other) competition 
does not enjoy in any country such position (such 
extent of protection) as freedom of doing business 
(economic freedom). Moreover, nowhere competition 
(free competition) does constitute determinant of 
public interest or such legally protected public 
interest as freedom of doing business. The only one 
state, in which constitution guarantee the freedom 
of competition is Mexico. Mexican Constitution of 
1917 (Constitutión Politica de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos) in art. 28 prohibits creating monopoly, 
granting tax exemptions, price speculations, or any 
other actions which restrict competition in production, 
industry, trade and services, concluding an agreement 
between producers, manufacturers, merchants, 
carriers, providers of services, aiming at competition 
restrictions or forcing consumers to pay unreasonable 
prices, and generally prohibits achieving exclusive 
and undue benefits by one or more individuals at 
the expense of entire society or certain social class. 
What is interesting, art. 28 is located in Section I of 
Constitution of Mexico titled “Individual guaranties” 
(Chart of liberties and civil rights) 22.
3. Safeguards of competition in the European Union 
latest public procurement directives
There is a set of three latest directives adopted by 
the European parliament and the Council that is 
relevant in terms of public procurement regulation. 
There are following legal acts: Directive 2014/23/
EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession 
contracts 23, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 
2004/18/EC (called: the “classical public sector 
directive”) 24, Directive 2014/25/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on procurement by entities operating in the water, 
energy, transport and postal services sectors and 
repealing Directive 2004/17/EC (called: the “utilities 
directive”) 25. Therefore, the previous set of public 
procurement directives was repealed, namely 
Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on coordinating 
the procurement procedures of entities operating 
in the water, energy, transport and postal services 
sectors (the ‘utilities directive”) 26, and Directive 
2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
 19 See more information about those theories in: Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, A Principled Approach to Abuse of Dominancie in European Competition 
Law, Cambridge 2010, p. 20 ff; and: Maher M. Dabbah, International and Comparative Competition Law, Cambridge 2010, p. 20 ff.
 20 See: Leopold Caro, Liberalizm i kapitalizm, Włocławek 1937, pp. 6–7; Karol Sobczak, Wolność gospodarcza a regulacje, Życie 
Gospodarcze 1997, Nr 29, p. 60. See considerations on free competition in: Ewa Przeszło, Zasada konkurencji w ustawie – Prawo 
zamówień publicznych, (w:) Granice wolności gospodarczej w systemie społecznej gospodarki rynkowej. Księga jubileuszowa z okazji 
40-lecia pracy naukowej prof. dr hab. Jana Grabowskiego, Katowice 2004, p. 217–218.
 21 Ewa Kozerska (in:) Ewa Kozerska, Piotr Sadowski, Andrzej Szymański, ed., Wolność w ujęciu historycznym i prawnym. Wybrane 
zagadnienia, Toruń 2010, p. 6.
 22 Legal regulation of competition law which is set in art. 28 of the Constitution of Mexico shall be regarded as being quite extensive. 
Nevertheless, more detailed regulation was introduced by the Mexican Federal Act of 24 December 1992 on Economic Competition (Ley 
Federal de la Competencia Económica) Diario Oficial de la Federación of 24.12.1992 r. (English version: http://r0.unctad.org/en/substites/
cpolicy/laws; 24.05.2016). See: Eduardo Pérez Motta, Heidi Claudia Sada Correa, Competition Policy in Mexico (in:) David Lewis, ed., 
Building New Competition Law Regimes. Selected Essays, Cheltenham, UK – Northampton, MA, USA, 2013, p. 3 ff.
 23 OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 1.
 24 OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 65.
 25 OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 243.
 26 OJ L 134, 30.4.2004, p. 1.
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Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of 
procedures for the award of public works contracts, 
public supply contracts and public service contracts 
(the “classical public sector directive”) 27.
Nevertheless, some legal acts remained in power. 
There are such directives like: Directive 2009/81/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the 
award of certain works contracts, supply contracts 
and service contracts by contracting authorities or 
entities in the fields of defence and security, and 
amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/
EC 28 (called: the “defence directive”), Directive 
2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council 
Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard 
to improving the effectiveness of review procedures 
concerning the award of public contracts 29, 
Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 
coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the application of Community 
rules on the procurement procedures of entities 
operating in the water, energy, transport and 
telecommunications sectors. They are mostly of 
procedural nature, but not only.
The latest directives of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, viz. directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/
EU and 2014/25/EU, are strongly concentrated on 
competition. However, competition among economic 
operators, where ‘economic operator’ is defined as 
any natural or legal person or public entity or group of 
such persons and/or entities, including any temporary 
association of undertakings, which offers the execution 
of works and/or a work, the supply of products or 
the provision of services on the market (art. 2 sec. 1 
subs.10 of Directive 2014/24/EU), is not the main 
and the only goal within this set of directives. It is quite 
broadly admitted that those directives are to achieve 
further simplification of the public tendering procedure, 
digitalization and computerization of the system 
(services provided via Internet), and general promotion 
of non-economic goals of public procurement system 
(qualitative factors, and additionally social, ecologic 
and pro-innovative goals). The main procompetitive 
goal is defined as provision of broad access to public 
tendering for micro, small and middle business (small 
and medium-sized undertakings, entrepreneurs; SMB). 
It remains beyond doubt that general simplification of the 
public tendering procedure (deformalizing the system), 
together with digitalization and computerization of the 
system (access via Internet), helps and stimulates SMBs 
access to the public procurement market, as well.
Starting with the Preamble to Directive 2014/24/EU 
we can read: “The award of public contracts by or on 
behalf of Member States’ authorities has to comply 
with the principles of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU), and in particular the 
free movement of goods, freedom of establishment 
and the freedom to provide services, as well as 
the principles deriving therefrom, such as equal 
treatment, non-discrimination, mutual recognition, 
proportionality and transparency” (paragraph 1). Any 
direct reference to competition (or free competition) 
is missing. This however does not mean that 
competition remains outside the scope of interest of 
the EU law. There are many specific regulations inside 
the mentioned directives which are actually aimed at 
fostering the economic competition. So it is necessary 
to start with article 18 of Directive 2014/24/EU 30 
which is titled “Principles of procurement”.
According to this regulation “Contracting authorities 
shall treat economic operators equally and without 
discrimination and shall act in a transparent 
and proportionate manner.  The design of the 
procurement shall not be made with the intention 
of excluding it from the scope of this Directive or of 
artificially narrowing competition. Competition shall 
be considered to be artificially narrowed where the 
design of the procurement is made with the intention of 
unduly favouring or disadvantaging certain economic 
operators”. Similar wording we can find in article 3 
titled “Principle of equal treatment, non-discrimination 
and transparency” of Directive 2014/23/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
February 2014 on the award of concession contracts, 
nonetheless there is no competition mentioned. 
Moreover, there is no competition as a principle 
provided in similar regulation inside Directive 
2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement 
by entities operating in the water, energy, transport 
and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 
2004/17/EC (“utilities directive”), and neither there 
is such regulation in Directive 2009/81/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 
2009 on the coordination of procedures for the 
 27 OJ L 134, 30.4.2004, p. 114.
 28 OJ L 216, 20.8.2009, p. 76.
 29 OJ L 335, 20.12.2007, p. 31.
 30 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing 
Directive 2004/18/EC (“classical public sector directive”) is the main point of reference in this Article. Nevertheless, other Directives cannot 
be undermined, and they are subjects of analyses as often as possible.
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award of certain works contracts, supply contracts 
and service contracts by contracting authorities or 
entities in the fields of defence and security, and 
amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC 
(“defence directive”).
One of the very important elements of broadly 
understood guarantees of free competition within 
the government acquisitions’ processes is the 
notion of ‘supplier’. It must be stressed that if there 
are many possible identities which may bid in the 
public tender, the range of competition is much 
broader. So the personal scope of public tendering 
on the side of supply plays the very crucial role. 
According to the Preamble to Directive 2014/24/EU 
the term “economic operators” (viz. suppliers) shall 
be interpreted as broadly as to make it possible to 
cover all persons and entities which offer provision 
of constructions’ works, supply of products or the 
provision of services on the market “irrespective of the 
legal form under which they have chosen to operate. 
Thus, firms, branches, subsidiaries, partnerships, 
cooperative societies, limited companies, universities, 
public or private, and other forms of entities than 
natural persons should all fall within the notion of 
economic operator, whether or not they are ‘legal 
persons’ in all circumstances (paragraph 14 of 
the Preamble). Noteworthy, a definition of ‘public 
operator’ is provided by art. 2 point 10 of Directive 
2014/24/EU). The same definition can be found 
in art. 2 sec. 6 of Directive 2014/25/EU (“utilities 
directive”) and art. 5 point 2 of Directive 2014/23/
EU (“concessions directive”). A different, and much 
more vague definition, may be found in the previous 
generation public procurement directive, namely 
Directive 2009/81/EC (“defence directive”), where 
according to art. 1 point 14 ”‘economic operator’ 
means a contractor, supplier or service provider. It is 
used merely in the interests of simplification”. 
Additionally, it is important to notice, that new 
2014 directives show a very relaxed approach to 
the concept of a consortium of entrepreneurs. The 
main goal of the mentioned concept is to allow 
suppliers to join their forces as to be able to cope 
with the tender. “It should be clarified that groups 
of economic operators, including where they have 
come together in the form of a temporary association, 
may participate in award procedures without it being 
necessary for them to take on a specific legal form. 
To the extent this is necessary, for instance where 
joint and several liability is required, a specific form 
may be required when such groups are awarded the 
contract” (paragraph 15 of the Preamble to Directive 
2014/24/EU) 31. There is a very relaxed approach 
to the concept of “economic operator” in definitions 
provided in Directive 2014/24/EU, where there is „any 
temporary association of undertakings” regarded as 
economic operator (art. 2 point 10 and art. 19 titled 
“Economic operators”, secs. 2–3, regulating so-
called ‘groups of operators’). The same wording we 
can find in art. 2 point 6 of Directive 2014/25/EU and 
art. 5 point 2 of Directive 2014/23/EU. Moreover, 
there is an obligation provided to countervail any 
distortion of competition among private suppliers in 
case of so-called public-public cooperation (art. 12 
of directive 2014/24/UE). “There is considerable 
legal uncertainty as to how far contracts concluded 
between entities in the public sector should be 
covered by public procurement rules. The relevant 
case-law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union is interpreted differently between Member 
States and even between contracting authorities. It is 
therefore necessary to clarify in which cases contracts 
concluded within the public sector are not subject 
to the application of public procurement rules. Such 
clarification should be guided by the principles set out 
in the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. The sole fact that both parties to an 
agreement are themselves public authorities does not 
as such rule out the application of procurement rules. 
However, the application of public procurement 
rules should not interfere with the freedom of public 
authorities to perform the public service tasks 
conferred on them by using their own resources, 
which includes the possibility of cooperation with 
other public authorities. It should be ensured that any 
exempted public-public cooperation does not result 
in a distortion of competition in relation to private 
economic operators in so far as it places a private 
provider of services in a position of advantage vis-à-
vis its competitors” (paragraph 31 of the Preamble to 
Directive 2014/24/EU) 32.
Furtherly, there are safeguards of SMB sector’s 
interests in terms of centralization of tendering 
process. ”There is a strong trend emerging across 
Union public procurement markets towards the 
aggregation of demand by public purchasers, with 
a view to obtaining economies of scale, including 
lower prices and transaction costs, and to improving 
and professionalising procurement management. This 
can be achieved by concentrating purchases either 
by the number of contracting authorities involved 
or by volume and value over time. However, the 
aggregation and centralisation of purchases should 
be carefully monitored in order to avoid excessive 
 31 See same words in paragraph 49 of the Preamble to Directive 2014/23/EU.
 32 See same words in paragraph 45 of the Preamble to Directive 2014/23/UE (concessions).
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concentration of purchasing power and collusion, and 
to preserve transparency and competition, as well as 
market access opportunities for SMEs” (paragraph 
59 of the Preamble to Directive 2014/24/EU). 
“Centralised purchasing techniques are increasingly 
used in most Member States. Central purchasing 
bodies are responsible for making acquisitions, 
managing dynamic purchasing systems or awarding 
public contracts/framework agreements for other 
contracting authorities, with or without remuneration. 
The contracting authorities for whom a framework 
agreement is concluded should be able to use it for 
individual or repetitive purchases. In view of the large 
volumes purchased, such techniques may help increase 
competition and should help to professionalise public 
purchasing. Provision should therefore be made 
for a Union definition of central purchasing bodies 
dedicated to contracting authorities and it should be 
clarified that central purchasing bodies operate in two 
different manners. Firstly, they should be able to act 
as wholesalers by buying, stocking and reselling or, 
secondly, they should be able to act as intermediaries 
by awarding contracts, operating dynamic purchasing 
systems or concluding framework agreements to be 
used by contracting authorities. Such an intermediary 
role might in some cases be carried out by conducting 
the relevant award procedures autonomously, without 
detailed instructions from the contracting authorities 
concerned; in other cases, by conducting the relevant 
award procedures under the instructions of the 
contracting authorities concerned, on their behalf and 
for their account. Furthermore, rules should be laid 
down for allocating responsibility for the observance 
of the obligations pursuant to this Directive, as between 
the central purchasing body and the contracting 
authorities procuring from or through it. Where the 
central purchasing body has sole responsibility for 
the conduct of the procurement procedures, it should 
also be solely and directly responsible for the legality 
of the procedures. Where a contracting authority 
conducts certain parts of the procedure, for instance 
the reopening of competition under a framework 
agreement or the award of individual contracts based 
on a dynamic purchasing system, it should continue to 
be responsible for the stages it conducts” (paragraph 
69 of the Preamble to Directive 2014/24/EU).
The access of SMBs to public tendering must be 
more open, especially in case of dynamic purchasing 
systems and framework agreements (see paragraphs 
61-66 of the Preamble to Directive 2014/24/EU). “In 
view of the experience acquired, there is also a need 
to adjust the rules governing dynamic purchasing 
systems to enable contracting authorities to take 
full advantage of the possibilities afforded by that 
instrument. The systems need to be simplified; in 
particular they should be operated in the form of a 
restricted procedure, hence eliminating the need 
for indicative tenders, which have been identified as 
one of the major burdens associated with dynamic 
purchasing systems. Thus any economic operator 
that submits a request to participate and meets the 
selection criteria should be allowed to take part in 
procurement procedures carried out through the 
dynamic purchasing system over its period of validity. 
This purchasing technique allows the contracting 
authority to have a particularly broad range of 
tenders and hence to ensure optimum use of public 
funds through broad competition in respect of 
commonly used or off-the-shelf products, works or 
services which are generally available on the market” 
(paragraph 63 of the Preamble to Directive 2014/24/
EU). “In order to further the possibilities of SMEs to 
participate in a large-scale dynamic purchasing 
system, for instance one that is operated by a central 
purchasing body, the contracting authority concerned 
should be able to articulate the system in objectively 
defined categories of products, works or services. 
Such categories should be defined by reference to 
objective factors which might for instance include the 
maximum allowable size of specific contracts to be 
awarded within the category concerned or a specific 
geographic area in which specific contracts are to 
be performed. Where a dynamic purchasing system 
is divided into categories, the contracting authority 
should apply selection criteria that are proportionate 
to the characteristics of the category concerned” 
(paragraph 66 of the Preamble to Directive 2014/24/
EU). Legal regulation of mentioned area is provided 
by arts. 33-34 of Directive 2014/24/EU. 
The need for transparency and competition within 
the framework agreements is firmly stressed in 
Directive 2009/81/EC (“defence directive”), as 
well. “Contracting authorities/entities may not use 
framework agreements improperly or in such a 
way as to prevent, restrict or distort competition”. 
“Framework agreements may not be used improperly 
or in such a way as to prevent, restrict or distort 
competition” (art. 29 sec. 2, art. 52 sec. 6 of Directive 
2009/81/EC).
It ought to be underlined that EU law legislator 
generally requires public tendering to be adjusted for 
SMBs. One of the most relevant means which are to 
serve this purpose is an obligation of partition of public 
procurement into parts with regard to quantitative and 
qualitative factors. “Public procurement should be 
adapted to the needs of SMEs. (…) To that end and to 
enhance competition, contracting authorities should 
in particular be encouraged to divide large contracts 
into lots. Such division could be done on a quantitative 
basis, making the size of the individual contracts better 
correspond to the capacity of SMEs, or on a qualitative 
basis, in accordance with the different trades and 
specialisations involved, to adapt the content of the 
individual contracts more closely to the specialised 
sectors of SMEs or in accordance with different 
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subsequent project phases. (…) Member States should 
remain free to go further in their efforts to facilitate the 
involvement of SMEs in the public procurement market, 
by extending the scope of the obligation to consider 
the appropriateness of dividing contracts into lots to 
smaller contracts, by requiring contracting authorities 
to provide a justification for a decision not to divide 
contracts into lots or by rendering a division into lots 
obligatory under certain conditions” (paragraph 78 
tirets 1 and 3 of the Preamble to Directive 2014/24/
EU; see art. 46 of Directive 2014/24/EU). 
Members States may limit the access to public 
procurement for only one supplier in terms of different 
parts of tendering: “Where contracts are divided into 
lots, contracting authorities should, for instance in 
order to preserve competition or to ensure reliability 
of supply, be allowed to limit the number of lots for 
which an economic operator may tender; they should 
also be allowed to limit the number of lots that may be 
awarded to any one tenderer” ” (paragraph 79 tiret1 
of the Preamble to Directive 2014/24/EU). Similar 
provisions may be found in Directive 2014/25/
UE (utilities; paragraphs 87–88 of the Preamble to 
Directive 2014/25/EU).
The problem of payments to subcontractors 
(most often SMBs) is noticed by European Union. 
Consequently, as to help the sector of SMBs, Member 
States should provide mechanisms for direct payments 
to subcontractors (paragraph 78 tiret 3 in fine of the 
Preamble to Directive 2014/24/EU; see art. art. 71 
sec. 3 of Directive 2014/24/EU). In the same time 
it is required that all subcontractors must be known 
to procuring entities (viz. transparency of the chain 
of subcontractors). “It is also necessary to ensure 
some transparency in the subcontracting chain, as 
this gives contracting authorities information on who 
is present at building sites on which works are being 
performed for them, or on which undertakings are 
providing services in or at buildings, infrastructures 
or areas, such as town halls, municipal schools, 
sports facilities, ports or motorways, for which the 
contracting authorities are responsible or over which 
they have a direct oversight (paragraph 105 tiret 2 of 
the Preamble to Directive 2014/24/EU; see art. 71 
secs. 2 and 5 of Directive 2014/24/EU). 
Another mean with an aim to simplify the process 
and to make it more open for SMBs and competition 
as such is a more relaxed approach to technical 
specifications. According to art. 42 titled “Technical 
specifications”) sec. 2 of Directive 2014/24/EU 
“Technical specifications shall afford equal access of 
economic operators to the procurement procedure 
and shall not have the effect of creating unjustified 
obstacles to the opening up of public procurement 
to competition. Generally, the technical specifications 
shall be prepared as to avoid any artificial limitation 
of competition. Such a limitation could be achieved 
by posing requirements which would be in favour 
of a certain supplier. “Consequently, technical 
specifications should be drafted in such a way as to 
avoid artificially narrowing down competition through 
requirements that favour a specific economic operator 
by mirroring key characteristics of the supplies, 
services or works habitually offered by that economic 
operator. Drawing up the technical specifications in 
terms of functional and performance requirements 
generally allows that objective to be achieved in 
the best way possible. Functional and performance-
related requirements are also appropriate means to 
favour innovation in public procurement and should 
be used as widely as possible. Where reference is 
made to a European standard or, in the absence 
thereof, to a national standard, tenders based on 
equivalent arrangements should be considered by 
contracting authorities. It should be the responsibility 
of the economic operator to prove equivalence with 
the requested label” (paragraph 74 tiret 2 of the 
Preamble to Directive 2014/24/EU; see arts. 42–44 
Directive 2014/24/EU).
The same purpose is served by relaxed approach 
to economic and financial capacity requirements 
put before suppliers in the public tendering process. 
“Overly demanding requirements concerning 
economic and financial capacity frequently constitute 
an unjustified obstacle to the involvement of SMEs in 
public procurement. Any such requirements should be 
related and proportionate to the subject- matter of the 
contract. In particular, contracting authorities should 
not be allowed to require economic operators to have 
a minimum turnover that would be disproportionate 
to the subject-matter of the contract; the requirement 
should normally not exceed at the most twice the 
estimated contract value. However, in duly justified 
circumstances, it should be possible to apply higher 
requirements. Such circumstances might relate to the 
high risks attached to the performance of the contract 
or the fact that its timely and correct performance is 
critical, for instance because it constitutes a necessary 
preliminary for the performance of other contracts” 
(paragraph 83 tiret 1 of the Preamble to Directive 
2014/24/EU). Requirements in such terms may be 
aggravated merely in case of a necessity to safeguard 
regularity and promptness of the work or supply 33, or 
in case of high risk immanent to a given procurement 
(art. 58 secs. 1 and 3 of Directive 2014/24/EU).
 33 For example, when a given work is a certain stage of given procurement, which is prerequisite for possibility to proceed to next stages.
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Suppliers have to be chosen on non-discriminatory 
and equal basis. “Contracts should be awarded on 
the basis of objective criteria that ensure compliance 
with the principles of transparency, non-discrimination 
and equal treatment, with a view to ensuring an 
objective comparison of the relative value of the 
tenders in order to determine, in conditions of effective 
competition, which tender is the most economically 
advantageous tender. It should be set out explicitly 
that the most economically advantageous tender 
should be assessed on the basis of the best price-
quality ratio, which should always include a price or 
cost element. It should equally be clarified that such 
assessment of the most economically advantageous 
tender could also be carried out on the basis of 
either price or cost effectiveness only. It is furthermore 
appropriate to recall that contracting authorities 
are free to set adequate quality standards by using 
technical specifications or contract performance 
conditions. In order to encourage a greater quality 
orientation of public procurement, Member States 
should be permitted to prohibit or restrict use of price 
only or cost only to assess the most economically 
advantageous tender where they deem this 
appropriate” (paragraph 90 tirets 1-2 of the Preamble 
to Directive 2014/24/EU). There are obligations of 
informative nature posed upon procuring entities, 
including obligation to indicate precisely the contract 
award criteria and the relative weighting given to 
each of those criteria (paragraph 90 tiret 3 of the 
Preamble to Directive 2014/24/EU; art. 67 sec. 5 of 
Directive 2014/24/EU).
The crucial notion in 2014 Directives is the term 
“award criteria”. The best way to present the notion 
is to use another term namely ‘most economically 
advantageous tender’ as “the economically best 
solution among those offered”. This is all aimed to 
avoid any misunderstanding and confusion with the 
concept used under previous generation of 2014 
directives (i.a. Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/
EC) called ‘most economically advantageous tender’. 
At present the goal of regulation is to  achieve ‘best 
price-quality ratio’ (paragraph 89 of the Preamble 
to Directive 2014/24/EU). In this area EU legislator 
is pointing at necessity to guarantee effective and 
fair competition. There is a list of criteria which 
decide to which supplier a procurement should be 
granted. This mentioned list encompasses criteria 
of a non-economic nature, like social and ecologic 
criteria as well 34. According to Directive 2014/24/
EU quality effectiveness should be supported by cost 
effectiveness, including price and life-cycle costing 
(paragraphs 92, 93–99 of the Preamble to Directive 
2014/24/EU; art. 67–68 of Directive 2014/24/EU).
As a principle, offers which present price that 
is blatantly low (“abnormally low price or costs 
proposed”) shall be rejected after submission of 
explanation which does not account for the low 
price or cost proposed (art. 69 titled “Abnormally 
low tenders”, secs. 1–5, of Directive 2014/24/EU; 
see additionally paragraph 103 of the Preamble to 
Directive 2014/24/EU).
Another pro-competitive safeguard is provided 
in art. 57 sec. 4 in fine and sec. 6 of Directive 
2014/24/EU. According to mentioned regulation, 
there is a principle of proportionality introduced in 
case of minor irregularities on side of suppliers (see 
additionally paragraph 101 tiret 3 of the Preamble to 
Directive 2014/24/EU).
Last, but not least, there must be an issue of general 
priority of the open tendering mode of procedure 
within the public procurement process underlined 
(as opposite to any methods of selective or limited 
tendering). Under art. 26 sec. 2 of Directive 2014/24/
EU there are two procedures mentioned: open 
procedure (fr. procédure ouverte, germ. Offenes 
Verfahren), regulated specifically by art. 27 of Directive 
2014/24/EU, and restricted procedure (fr. procédure 
restreinte, germ. Nichtoffenes Verfahren), regulated 
specifically by art. 28 of Directive 2014/24/EU. At the 
same time Directive 2014/24/EU stresses firmly the 
right of procuring entities (contracting authorithies) 
to pick a given procedure of its choice, especially 
in terms of trans-border public procurements. In 
such circumstances, Directive 2014/24/EU offers 
a competitive procedure with negotiation (fr. 
procédure concurrentielle avec négociation, germ. 
Verhandlungsverfahren), regulated by art. 29 of 
Directive, and competitive dialogue (fr. dialogue 
competitive, germ. Wettbewerblicher Dialog), 
regulated by art. 30 of Directive. According to the 
Preamble to Directive 2014/24/EU: “There is a great 
need for contracting authorities to have additional 
flexibility to choose a procurement procedure, which 
provides for negotiations. A greater use of those 
procedures is also likely to increase cross-border 
trade, as the evaluation has shown that contracts 
awarded by negotiated procedure with prior 
publication have a particularly high success rate of 
cross-border tenders. Member States should be able 
to provide for use of the competitive procedure with 
negotiation or the competitive dialogue, in various 
situations where open or restricted procedures 
without negotiations are not likely to lead to 
satisfactory procurement outcomes. It should be 
recalled that use of the competitive dialogue has 
significantly increased in terms of contract values over 
 34 See additionally for example paragraph 35 of the Preamble to Directive 2009/81/EC (“defence directive”).
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the past years. It has shown itself to be of use in cases 
where contracting authorities are unable to define the 
means of satisfying their needs or of assessing what 
the market can offer in terms of technical, financial or 
legal solutions. This situation may arise in particular 
with innovative projects, the implementation of major 
integrated transport infrastructure projects, large 
computer networks or projects involving complex 
and structured financing. Where relevant, contracting 
authorities should be encouraged to appoint a 
project leader to ensure good cooperation between 
the economic operators and the contracting authority 
during the award procedure”.
4. Results. Conclusions and relevance
It is important to notice that direct references to 
competition (or free competition) as to the main 
principle are missing in new 2014 EU public 
procurement directives, namely Directive 2014/23/
EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession 
contracts (“concessions directive”), Directive 
2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement 
and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (“classical 
public sector directive”), Directive 2014/25/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
February 2014 on procurement by entities operating 
in the water, energy, transport and postal services 
sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC 
(“utilities directive”). Nevertheless, it does not mean 
that competition remains outside the scope of interest 
of the EU law. There are many specific regulations 
inside the mentioned directives which are actually 
aimed at fostering economic competition.  Generally 
speaking,  the overall shape of the public tendering 
cannot contradict the free competition among 
suppliers (called in latest directives as “economic 
operators”). Furthermore, there are many specific 
regulations which in fact provide for a competition on 
the public procurement market in the EU, too. One of 
the most important areas of regulation at stake is a 
general attempt to open public procurement market 
for micro, small and medium enterprises (SMBs’ 
sector). So many particular means of achieving this 
goal serve in fact the competition, as well, and they 
cannot be undermined. 
Noteworthy, the only old directive of material scope 
which remained in force is Directive 2009/81/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the 
award of certain works contracts, supply contracts 
and service contracts by contracting authorities or 
entities in the fields of defence and security, and 
amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC 
(“defence directive”). This ‘old style’ directive does not 
provide for open access to the procurement for SMBs. 
However, terms ‘competition’ and ‘free competition’ 
are often used in the legal text of Directive.
Consequently, it may be stated that to outward 
seeming an economic competition is not the main 
goal of the regulation at stake. However, the analysis 
of legal texts of all directives which regulate the 
public procurement in the European Union leads 
to a conclusion that in fact all regulation is about 
competition. This is achieved by opening of the public 
procurement market to SMBs sector and by relaxing 
and simplifying the public procurement requirements 
and procedure. So the relevance of the research 
and its results is such, that the EU public procurement 
regulation may be regarded as a part of general 
competition regulation, with an aim to foster and 
guarantee and economic free competition on the 
public procurement market.
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